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A B S T R A C T
Global GDP projections for the 21st century are needed for the exploration of long-term global
environmental problems, in particular climate change. Greenhouse gas emissions as well as climate
change mitigation and adaption capacities strongly depend on growth of per capita income. However,
long-term economic projections are highly uncertain. This paper provides ﬁve new long-term economic
scenarios as part of the newly developed shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs) which represent a set
of widely diverging narratives. A method of GDP scenario building is presented that is based on
assumptions about technological progress, and human and physical capital formation asmajor drivers of
long-term GDP per capita growth. The impact of these drivers differs signiﬁcantly between different
shared socio-economic pathways and is traced back to the underlying narratives and the associated
population and education scenarios. In a highly fragmented world, technological and knowledge
spillovers are low. Hence, the growth impact of technological progress and human capital is
comparatively low, and per capita income diverges between world regions. These factors play a much
larger role in globalization scenarios, leading to higher economic growth and stronger convergence
between world regions. At the global average, per capita GDP is projected to grow annually in a range
between 1.0% (SSP3) and 2.8% (SSP5) from 2010 to 2100. While this covers a large portion of variety in
future global economic growth projections, plausible lower and higher growth projections may still be
conceivable. The GDP projections are put into the context of historic patterns of economic growth
(stylized facts), and their sensitivity to key assumptions is explored.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The level of global environmental change, in particular climate
change, depends on the scale of economic activities and the
technologies employed. Scenarios of future human impact on
the global environment are therefore built upon projections of
economic output. The increasing demand for such projections is
confronted with a shortage of available projections for the
development of the world economy over the 21st century.
Kemp-Benedict (2012) lists few prominent examples of available
projections, among others the Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000) and the World Energy Outlooks of
the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2009). Both studies generate
projections of economic output by assuming exogenous regional
growth rates of gross domestic product or productivity. This
assumption-based approach can be contrastedwith amodel-based
approach, wherein a projection of the development of the global* Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 331288 2556.
E-mail address: leimbach@pik-potsdam.de (M. Leimbach).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.02.005
0959-3780/ 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articeconomy is produced from an economic model, e.g. WorldScan
(Lejour et al., 2006).
The contribution of this paper is to develop a set of ﬁve long-
term GDP projections as part of the shared socio-economic
pathways (SSPs) (O’Neill et al., 2014), a major component of a
new scenario framework (van Vuuren et al., 2014). The SSPs
describe socio-economic futures with different challenges to
mitigation and adaptation. They serve as a reference case for
climate change analysis, and therefore do not include climate
policies or the impact of climate change in their formulation.
The GDP projections presented in this paper are based both on the
underlying narratives of the SSPs (O’Neill et al., 2015) and a well
understood economic model. The process of transforming the
narratives into model parameters is made transparent. We use the
neoclassical model developed by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow
(1957), augmented with regard to human capital (Lucas, 1988;
Romer, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; Aghion and Howitt, 1998) and
the role of demographics and institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
The results are validated against stylized facts depicting typical
economic growth patterns of the past. This paper applies a scenario
approach which follows the methodology by Hawksworth (2006).
We go beyond that approach, however, when deriving projectionsle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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foundation of the former and a semi-endogenous modeling of the
latter, the present approach allows for an improved regional
differentiation of scenarios.
In discussing their approaches to generating long-term global
scenarios and projections of economic growth, Kemp-Benedict
(2012) as well as McKibbin et al. (2009) highlight the issue of
convergence. As a characteristic feature, the stylized neoclassical
economic models imply convergence across countries in economic
output per worker over time. This implicit convergence assumption
is highly debated. In a recent paper, Rodrik (2013) demonstrates
evidence ofunconditional convergence inmanufacturing industries.
On an economy-wide level, however, co-existence of stagnant
economies and rapidly growing economies shows that convergence
is not universal. Some authors even pointed out that divergence
rather than convergence has been the dominant trend in the world
economy (Durlauf, 1996; Pritchett, 1997; Easterly, 2006). Instead of
assuming unconditional convergence, Galor (1996) suggests two
competing convergence hypotheses: conditional convergence and
club convergence. Acknowledging the importance of the conver-
gence assumption and the discussion in the economic literature on
this, we put some effort in justifying our approach. We adopted a
framework that is based on the conditional convergence hypothesis
applied in a neoclassical growth framework (cf. Kemp-Benedict,
2012). Speciﬁcation of the convergence assumption is derived from
the underlying SSP storylines.
In this paper, we establish a consistent set of GDP projections
for 32 world regions and the period 2010–2100 based on a set of
population and education projections for the ﬁve SSPs (see [8_TD$DIFF]KC and
Lutz, 2017[9_TD$DIFF]). The goal is to explore key factors leading to a large
spread in plausible economic futures and to provide a useful
resource for the integrated assessment of climate change. The
generation of GDP projections is based on a sound understanding
on the drivers of economic growth. In Section 2, we provide some
fundamental insights from the economic literature on growth
accounting and stylized facts. Section 3 describes the method that
is used to generate the GDP projections. The resulting set of ﬁve
GDP scenarios is presented and evaluated in Section 4. Gross world
product in the year 2100 varies by a factor of three across the
scenarios.We explore the consistency of scenario assumptions, run
a sensitivity analysis and confront scenario results with the
stylized facts that have been established in economic literature.
We end with some conclusions.
2. Theoretical and empirical foundation
The questions of what determines a country’s growth rate of
GDP, andwhy countries grow at different rates are amajor concern
of theoretical and empirical economic research since the beginning
of modern economics. The neoclassical production function is
predominantly used to answer these questions. It represents a
technological relationship which expresses the level of output as a
function of the level of inputs, such as labor, capital, and land. Over
the last century, much of scientiﬁc effort has gone into ﬁnding a
speciﬁc form of the production function. It turned out that the
Cobb–Douglas production function will give the best statistical ﬁt
to empirical data, if the elasticities of output to factor inputs are
constant and the technical progress is Hicksian-neutral (McCombie
and Thirlwall, 1995). Assuming a constant rate of technical
progress l, it takes the form:
YðtÞ ¼ Að0ÞeltKðtÞaLðtÞ1a (I)
where Y denotes output (GDP), A total factor productivity (TFP), K
capital stock, L labor input anda the output elasticity on capital. An
advantage of Cobb–Douglas’ style production functions is theapproximate correspondence of the estimated elasticities with the
actual factor income shares. Based on the Cobb–Douglas produc-
tion function, the growth accounting approach tries to explain
output growth by the growth rates of labor, capital and technical
progress. An overview of this research branch is provided as
Supplementary Material S [10_TD$DIFF].1.
While the recent economic literature, in particular those on
endogenous growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1998) provides
alternatives and new insights, the Solow-Swan model (Solow,
1957) and the Cobb–Douglas function are still prevalent tools in
exploring historic and future economic growth paths. The number
of growth factors taken into account by the growth accounting
literature is huge. The impact of investments, education and
technological catching up is robust. Therefore, they form the basic
components of the scenario approach presented in Section 3.
Explanatory power of other factors varies between different
studies or signiﬁcance changed between early and more recent
studies (e.g. R&D investments). The importance of growth factors is
different between countries in general and especially between
developed and developing parts of the world.
[2_TD$DIFF]While the growthaccounting approachhelps to identify themost
relevant variables that might have impact on regional growth paths
in the future, a related branch of empirical research developed
a framework that helps to evaluate simulated growth scenarios
based on a number of stylized facts. Such stylized factswere derived
from historical data and theoretical economic reasoning. They
neglect short-term ﬂuctuations but reveal underlying trends. In a
seminal paper, Kaldor (1961) suggested six empirically observable
‘stylized facts’ which should be replicated by any economic growth
model. Since then, these facts have been widely discussed and
extended, in particular to also capture general trends and growth
patterns beyond high-growth countries or to include later concepts
from economic growth theory such as human capital and ideas (e.g.
Dollar, 1992;Easterly,1994;Dosi, 1995;AcemogluandAutor, 2011).
Jones and Romer (2010) presented New Kaldor facts on new
variables discussed in the economic growth theory, but they also
extended the set of facts that are related to technological progress
and the total factor productivity, respectively. Based on a review of
the empirical literature on economic growth, we selected a list of
relevant stylized facts (see Table 1) to evaluate the GDP projections
as well as the underlying growth model. The selection was
constrained to those stylized facts that meaningfully could be
tested with the developed projections and the data available.
Therefore, not all stylized facts listed, e.g. in Jones and Romer (2010)
or Dosi (1995), are considered in this study.
3. Scenario design
3.1. Method and data
The basic approach is an extension of the method used by
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Hawksworth, 2006). Like in Hawks-
worth (2006) we applied a Cobb–Douglas production function as
the basic tool. We also adopted the same method of introducing
human capital via labor productivity. We, however, applied a
different, more elaborated methodology in deriving projections
of physical capital and total factor productivity (see Sections 3.5
and 3.6). These improvements allow us to integrate additional
empirical data (historical development of production factors,
productivity and capital intensities) into the scenario generation.
Moreover, they provide the basis for a more distinct set of
scenarios with an improved coverage of region-speciﬁc character-
istics of the underlying narratives (e.g. convergence of developing
regions with respect to overall productivity and capital intensity).
Fig. 1 shows themost important elements of the scenario design.
TheSolowgrowthmodeland theCobb–Douglasproduction function
Table 1
Stylized facts.
Stylized fact Description
Kaldor SF 2 Capital per worker increases continuously
Kaldor SF 4 The capital output ratio is steady over time
New Kaldor NSF 3 (Jones and Romer, 2010) Variation in the rate of growth of per-capita GDP increases with the distance from the technology frontier
New Kaldor NSF 4 (Jones and Romer, 2010) Large income and TFP differences. Differences in labor and capital inputs explain less than half of cross
country differences in per capita GDP
New Kaldor NSF 5 (Jones and Romer, 2010) Human capital per worker is rising throughout the world
Dosi DSF 10 Positive correlation between investment rates and economic growth
Growth Accounting GSF 2
(Quah, 1996; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011)
There is no evidence for conditional convergence across the world and the world income distribution shows
an emergence of a twin-peak pattern
Growth Accounting GSF 4 There is some evidence for a hump shaped growth pattern (beta-convergence), i.e. high growth rates in a
catch-up phase
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each country or region is, hence, formulated as a function of the
production factors capital and labor which are combined with total
factor productivityand theoutput elasticities oncapital and labor. In
going beyond the classical Solow approach, all of these components
are derived by qualiﬁed scenarios that are either based on further
economic concepts (Ramsey model, human capital), empirical
foundation (historic TFP growth) or on the narratives of shared
socio-economic pathways. Each component will be discussed in
further detail below.
In preparing and assessing the GDP scenarios we make use of
historical data from the following sources: L[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]abor, population and age structure (country-based, 1950–2010):UN
(2010) database Education, i.e. mean years of school (country-based, 1950–2005):
Barro and Lee (2010) Physical capital (country-based, 1950–2010):King and Levine
(1994), Penn World Tables (PWT) 7.1 (Heston et al., 2012) Labor participation (country-based, 1950–2010):International
Labor Organization (ILO, 2011) GDP and macro-economic investments (country-based, 1950–
2010):PWT 7.1 (Heston et al., 2012).
There is no complete historical dataset available for all
countries from 1950 on. In order to derive datasets for aggregated
regions, we applied population weighted extrapolations to ﬁll
missing data. With regard to physical capital, we used the
perpetual inventory method applied to reported investment data.
In case of too short investment time series, we derived an initial
historical capital stock by assuming a ﬁxed capital GDP ratio of
2.5. Historical GDP from PWT 7.1 is measured in internationalFig. 1. Components of Gdollars of purchasing power parity (PPP) of the year 2005, thus
reﬂecting growth of the economies in real terms of domestic
currency. This measure also applies to the GDP scenarios to be
constructed.
As major source for the future development of population,
working-age population andmean years of school, we used the SSP
population scenarios from IIASA (KC and Lutz, [11_TD$DIFF]2017).
3.2. SSP narratives
Since the GDP projections are supposed to be used as part of the
SSPs, the GDP scenario design follows the underlying SSP
narratives. There are ﬁve different SSPs which in the ﬁrst instance
are differentiated by their climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion challenges. SSP1 (‘‘Sustainability’’) characterizes a world that
makes progress toward sustainability, including rapid develop-
ment of low-income countries, and hence faces lowmitigation and
adaptation challenges. SSP2 is a kind of ‘‘middle of the road
Scenario’’ with continuing historical trends and medium chal-
lenges in both dimensions. SSP3 (‘‘Regional Rivalry’’) is a strongly
fragmented world characterized by a high level of poverty, subject
to high mitigation and adaptation challenges. SSP4 (‘‘Inequality’’)
represents a highly unequal world. The large number of poor
people across countries face high adaptation challenges, while the
economy catering the rich is technologically advanced and capable
to reduce mitigation challenges by developing alternative tech-
nologies. Finally, SSP5 (‘‘Fossil-fueled development’’) characterizes
a growth-oriented world that uses conventional technologies (in
particular fossil fuel based energy conversion technologies) and
therefore faces high mitigation challenges. Similar to SSP1, in SSP5
per capita income across regions is expected to converge, though
on a higher level and therefore within a longer time horizon.DP scenario design.
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projections. The narrative elements that relate to the development
of the global per capita income level were translated into
assumptions on the TFP growth at the frontier. Analogously, from
the level of fragmentation, globalization and development
expectations in less developed countries, assumptions on the
speed of convergence have been derived.
3.3. Regional breakdown
GDP scenarios are generated for 32 world regions. Table A1 in
Appendix shows the country mapping. For the purpose of scenario
generation, which is based on the narratives as brieﬂy discussed in
the previous section, we categorize the 32 regions according to
their current income level into three income groups (partly already
identiﬁed by their acronym). Details on these income groups are
provided as SupplementaryMaterial S2. This classiﬁcation helps to
address elements in the narratives that differentiate between
income groups. This, in particular, applies to a differentiation
between developing countries (i.e. middle income countries) with
good prospects of catching up with high income countries and
those which potentially will be left behind (i.e. low income
countries).
While the regional decomposition does not allow for single-
country scenarios as provided by Dellink et al. ( [12_TD$DIFF] 017) and
Cuaresma ( [12_TD$DIFF] 017), the aggregation across countries with similar
characteristics of economic growthand its drivers canbe expected
tomakeprojectionsmore robust. This ismainly due to the fact that
for major drivers, like TFP growth, assumptions have to be
made forwhich a country-speciﬁc differentiation is hard to justify
over the scenario time horizon. However, the match with stylized
facts that represent regional diversiﬁcation measures (e.g. GSF4,
cf. Sections 2 and 4.3) is hindered by the coarse regional
resolution.
3.4. Labor and human capital
Labor input is derived from the SSP population projections ([8_TD$DIFF]KC
and Lutz, [12_TD$DIFF] 017). While the working age population is the basis for
the production factor labor, per capita income as a major output of
the GDP projections is related to the entire population. The
production factor labor in the Cobb–Douglas function has three
components: working age people (WAP), labor force participation
rate (LFPR) and education (H):
LðtÞ ¼
X
q
HðtÞLFPRðq; tÞWAPðq; tÞ (II)
While suppressing in the above equation the region and
scenario index, we include time index t and distinguish two age
classes q for the working age people: those aged 15–64 years and
those aged 65 and above. Each of the two working age groups is
characterized by a particular labor force participation rate. Details
on the projections for the labor force participation rates acrossTable 2
Main assumptions for SSP GDP projections.
SSP element SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4a SSP5
TFP growth at
frontier
Medium Medium Low Medium High
Speed of
convergence
High Medium Low LI: low
MI: medium
HI: medium
High
a In SSP4, the speed of convergence differs across country groupings with
different income levels. LI: low income countries, MI: middle income countries, HI:
high income countriestime, age groups and regions are provided as Supplementary
Material S3.
By multiplying the participation rates with the respective
population numbers, we arrive at the actual number of working
people. The next step is to account for the quality differences that
are due to different levels of education. As a measure of education
we use the ‘‘Mean Years of Schooling’’ (MYS) provided jointly with
the population projections from [8_TD$DIFF]KC and Lutz (2017). In order to
calculate human capital we use the same approach as Hawksworth
(2006), which refers to Psacharopoulos (1994). Each of the ﬁrst
four years of education increases human capital by 13.4%, each
subsequent year until the eighth mean year of schooling increases
human capital by 10.1% and every year of education after that
yields a return of 6.8%. Education acts as a scaling factor on labor
according to the following equation:
H ¼
e0:134MYS; MYS  4
e½0:536þ0:101ðMYS4Þ; 4<MYS  8
e½0:94þ0:068ðMYS8Þ; MYS>8
8<
: (III)
Ahypothetical population lackinganyeducationwould therefore
enter the production function with its actual number of people in
theworkforce, whilst for example a populationwith 16 mean years
of schooling would enter the production function with 4.41 times
the actual number of people participating in the workforce.
The given education scenarios exhibit almost no increase of
MYS for SSP3 and SSP4, a moderate increase for SSP2 and a
signiﬁcant improvement for SSP1 and SSP5. For the latter [17_TD$DIFF]SSPs, this
results in an increase of effective labor input (quality-adjusted
labor input). Nevertheless, due to the decrease of the working age
population in different regions (e.g. in Japan, China, also India), the
quality – adjusted labor input does not increase over time for all
regions, even in these SSPs.
3.5. Physical capital stock
The original Solow model and the approach used by Hawks-
worth (2006) assume exogenous savings rates. While this could be
based on historical data, its extensive use is hindered by the weak
data quality. For some countries (like Russia and other Eastern
European countries) data are not available before 1970 or even
1990, for others like China they seem not reliable (nearly constant
rate over the time period 1952–2005).
In going beyond the assumption of an exogenous savings rate,
here we derive a savings rate that meets some implicit optimality
criteria given by applying the Cobb–Douglas production function
in a growth dynamic framework. Similar to the economic growth
models, this approach starts from the macro-economic accounting
assumption that the amount of saving equals the amount of
investment.
Investments I increase the available stock of physical capital K
which is described by the following equation (with d as
depreciation rate and t as time index):
Kðt þ 1Þ ¼ ð1 dÞ  KðtÞ þ IðtÞ (IV)
This equation is used for estimating historical capital stocks
based on available investment data. Projection of future capital
stocks is based on analytical reasoning. Details are provided as
Supplementary Material S4. From the analytical approach we
derive the following recursive equation for the capital stock
variable:
KðtÞ ¼ Kðt  1Þ
Lðt  1Þ
 ð1aðt1ÞÞ=ð1aðtÞÞ
 KðtÞ
YðtÞ 
Yðt  1Þ
Kðt  1Þ 
AðtÞ
Aðt  1Þ
 ð1=ð1aðtÞÞÞ
 LðtÞ (V)
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addition to TFP and labor input (Sections 3.4 and 3.6), projections
for elasticity parameter a and capital intensity K/Y are needed. We
assume a long-term level for the elasticity parameter a which is
different across the SSP scenarios. Parameter a also bears the
economic meaning of an income share parameter which it attains
as part of an equilibrium solution of a welfare or proﬁt
maximization model. Commonly, it is assumed that there is a
division of income between capital and labor in the ratio of 1:2, i.e.
a = 1/3. Within African countries with low capital endowments
this share is below 20%, whereas in a country like Japan it is close to
50%. Within the scenarios SSP1 and SSP5, which are characterized
by a high level of international co-operation, we assume a long-
term convergence to the values of 0.35 and 0.45, respectively,
across all regions. We assume a much higher level for SSP5 as this
high growth scenario is expected to be driven partly by large
capital accumulation. A medium value of 0.35 is also assumed for
SSP2. Convergence to this long-term level, however, is much
slower. Slow convergence and a low level of 0.25 are assumed for
this elasticity parameter in SSP3. By this assumption we model a
world where national economies are rather labor intensive than
capital intensive. Even slower convergence and a long-term level of
0.3 are assumed for SSP4.
The capital intensity and hence the capital stock can then be
derived by using the following identity:
a ¼ pK 
K
Y
(VI)
with pK the price of capital, i.e. the return rate on gross capital
investments. We assumed a capital price level of 0.12 across all
SSPs and all regions. Sensitivity analysis on this assumption is
provided in Supplementary Material S7 and projection of capital
intensity is shown in Table S4 (Supplementary Material S4).
3.6. Total factor productivity
Growth accounting studies demonstrated that in a Solowmodel
framework TFP plays a dominant role, i.e. a major part of observed
growth is attributed to TFP growth. The present approach of
providing TFP input for GDP projections is based on the assumption
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
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Fig. 2. Empirically derived TFP (based onthat the empirically observed growth pattern in form of an
exponential growth trajectory (see Fig. 2 for selected countries) is
also reﬂected in the future dynamics of the TFP. Starting from that,
this approach is based on four components: (I) Assumption on the
TFP growth rate for the technological leader, (II) short term
dynamics based on empirically derived initial TFP growth rate, (III)
convergence rate for catching-up with the technological leader in
the long run, (IV) transition time between historically dominated
TFP growth and convergence-based long-term TFP growth.
According to the characterization as high,medium and lowGDP
growth scenario, we assumed a medium long-term TFP growth
rate (gL) for the technological leader of 0.7% per year and an
increase and decrease of this rate by 50% for the high growth and
low growth scenario, respectively, i.e.:(I) STF
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(II) SSP3: 0.35%
(III) SSP5: 1.05%.For the TFP of the technological leader AL it holds (with time
index t, initial TFP growth rate gLA and transition rate g):
ALðtÞ ¼ ALð0Þ  f1þ ½gL þ ðgLA  gLÞ  egtg
t
(VII)
The TFP A of all other regions r is calculated based on the
following formula (b is a convergence parameter and t the
transition time between the two phases of TFP growth in units of
time step length which is 5 years):
Aðt þ 1; rÞ ¼
t fALðt þ 1Þ ½ALðt þ 1Þ Aðt; rÞg etðbðrÞ=10Þ
þðtðrÞ  tÞ  ð1þ gAðrÞÞAðt; rÞ
tðrÞ t  t
maxfAðt; rÞ;ALðt þ 1Þ  ½ALðt þ 1Þ
Aðt; rÞ  etðbðrÞ=10Þg t> t
8>><
>>:
(VIII)
For transparency reasons we still suppress the scenario index
which actually applies to almost all variables and parameters.
While the second formula describes the long-term convergence
process (or non-convergence process if b is negative or close to
zero), the ﬁrst equation represents the evolution of the TFP as a0
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convergence-based TFP.
Details on the computation of initial growth rate gA are
provided in Supplementary Material S5. This material also
documents the derived initial TFP levels and TFP growth rates.
The estimated TFP level in 2010 is highest for Japan (0.064), the
EFTA region (0.061) and the USA (0.057). Highest initial TFP growth
rates of more than 17% over 5 years (weighted average) are
observed in OAS-CPA, China, Korea, India and Taiwan. Limitations
of the quality of the capital stock data input as well as the use of
education data from two different data sources weaken the
robustness of this intermediate output. Nonetheless, backward
casting with the derived initial TFP growth rates ﬁt quite well for
the time span of 30–40 years.Moreover, by using initial TFP growth
rates that cover a long-term trend we reduce the short-term
impact of the recent ﬁnancial crises on the long-term projections.
Nevertheless this break in economic growth is covered in the 2010
ﬁgures of our projections (see Fig. 5, next section).
Table S[19_TD$DIFF]5 in the Supplementary Material S5 summarizes the
assumptions that have been made for the different regions and
SSPs for the remaining two components: convergence rate and
transition time in years. These assumptions follow the growth
characteristic as given by the SSP storylines and are discussed in
the Supplementary Material S5.
4. Results
GDP projections are computed for each world region and SSP
based on the derived projections for the inputs capital stock,
quality adjusted labor and total factor productivity as described in
the previous sections. Due to size constraints, we can only provide
a selection of scenario results. A comprehensive data set and a tool
for visualization can be accessed via the publically available SSP
database (https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/dsd?
Action=htmlpage&page=series).[(Fig._4)TD$FIG]T
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Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the global scenarios of GDP and GDP per
capita, respectively. GDP is presented as real GDP measured in
constant 2005 prices of purchasing power parity (PPP). World GDP
increases from US$ 48.7 trillion in 2000 to a value between US$
309 trillion for SSP3 andUS$ 906 trillion for SSP5 in 2100. Assuming
a constant ratio between international dollars measured in PPP and
measured in market exchange rates (MER) for all 32 regions, this
translates into MER values between US$ 150 and 550 trillion.
Continued growth, although on different levels across the SSP
scenarios, can be observed for global output. On the regional level,
however, we see a downturn of the absolute GDP level for most of
the high income regions in SSP3. The small increase of total factor
productivity cannot compensate the shrinking labor input. Due to
demographic changes in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Eastern Europe and
above all China this also applies to SSP1 and SSP4.
Due to increasing global population until themid of the century
in nearly all SSP scenarios, growth rate of global GDP per capita is
lower than that for global GDP. The ranking of the SSPswith respect
[(Fig._5)TD$FIG]
Fig. 5. Per capita income projected for USA, China, India and low into the long-term per capita income is quite distinct. The high
growth scenario SSP5 exhibits the highest per capita income level
in 2100 (aroundUS$ 120,000), followed by SSP1 (US$ 77,000), SSP2
(US$ 63,000), SSP4 (US$ 46,000), and SSP3 (US$ 24,000). SSP3 is the
scenario that deviate earliest from the others. Signiﬁcant
differences in the per capita levels can already be observed in
2030. In contrast, a signiﬁcant difference between SSP2 and SSP4
cannot be observed before 2060.
However, on a regional level and in the short-term, the ranking
of the SSP scenarios is not so distinct. Table 3 shows the GDP per
capita growth rates separated for two time spans and the three
income groups that were introduced in the previous chapter.
Already on this still aggregated level it can be seen that for example
in the time span between 2010 and 2040 the high and middle
income countries have a slightly higher growth rate in SSP4 than in
SSP2.
Table 3 also shows that the high income group countries always
have the lowest average growth rates, while the growth rates are
highest in the low income group for SSP1, SSP2, and SSP5, and
highest for SSP3 and SSP4 in the middle income group. Across allcome sub-Saharan Africa (each panel shows one SSP scenario).
M. Leimbach et al. / Global Environmental Change 42 (2017) 215–225222SSP scenarios growth rates are higher in the short term than in the
long term. This is explained, on the one hand, by the expectation
that the relatively high growth rates achieved in the decades after
World War II cannot be maintained. This is captured by the
assumption on the TFP growth rates of the technological leader
(Section 3.6). On the other hand, a slow-downof economic growth
can be expected once the developing world regions have caught
up.
In order to look at the resulting convergence properties of the
scenarios, we analyze the per capita GDP development of four
different regions (see Fig. 5): (i) the USA as member of the high
income group, (ii) China and India as members of the middle
income group, and [20_TD$DIFF] sub-Saharan Africa [21_TD$DIFF](SSA-L[22_TD$DIFF]) as representative of
the low income group.
In SSP1, SSP5 and to some extent also in SSP2 we see a
convergence pattern that represents a possible future in which
one important aspect of the historic economic development is
reﬂected. This is the catching-up of single countries and regions
with the technological leaders. This has been observed for some
of the currently advanced countries in the past, for Korea in the
very recent past, it can be seen today for other south Asian
countries as well as China, and is expected for India in the near
future. In contrast to this, in SSP3 and SSP4 we see another
development which is in line with another historical trend – that
of divergence between the technologically leading countries and
a majority of other countries. Although in the present scenarios
this mostly applies to the four low-income regions only, due to
their increasing population share at the end of the century more
than half of the world population will live in countries left
behind. This clearly represents the underlying storyline of the
respective SSPs.[(Fig._6)TD$FIG]
Fig. 6. Decomposition of GDP per capita growth4.2. Contribution of TFP, labor, capital
Fig. 6 shows the contribution of the three factors TFP, capital
and labor to the growth of per capita GDP. Based on the Cobb–
Douglas production function the following decomposition holds:
DY
Y
¼ DA
A
þ a DK
K
þ ð1 aÞ DL
L
(IX)
with the weighting factors a and (1  a) for the capital and labor
growth rates.
With respect to labor, it is the quality adjustment due to
education and the ratio between population growth and working
population growth that matters most. Nevertheless, except for
SSA-L in the ﬁrst periods this contribution is relatively small.
Due to a decreasing share of working people in most of the high-
income regions, even a negative contribution of the factor labor can
be observed (for the USA in Fig. 6). TFP growth in general
contributes most to the GDP per capita growth. It is also mostly
affected when changing the assumptions on the level of economic
growth. While this is not surprising, the comparison of the growth
rates of SSP2 and SSP3 also shows that with the decrease of the
contribution of the TFP in SSP3 compared to SSP2, also the
contribution of the capital factor is reduced.
While the underlying narratives give an indication of the range
and differentiation of themajor parameters of the GDP projections,
the chosen values bear uncertainty. Within the sensitivity analysis
provided as Supplementary Material S7, we checked the robust-
ness of the GDP projections. Sensitivity is checked against sixmajor
parameters: Labor force participation rate, return on education,
long-term capital output elasticity, growth of the technological
leader, initial value of TFP, and the convergence rate. Overall, werate for USA and SSA-L in SSP2 and SSP3.
[(Fig._7)TD$FIG]
Fig. 7. Representation of New Kaldor fact NSF3: (a) SSP2 and (b) SSP3.
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parameter changes. The magnitude of parameter variation is
relatively large, but none of the experiments results in a shift of the
GDP trajectory into another growth mode or changes the ranking
across the SSP projections. We therefore are very conﬁdent in the
robustness of our parameter choices and their representation of
the narratives.
4.3. Stylized facts
How do the GDP projections perform against the stylized facts
introduced in Section 2 (Table 1)? It needs to be kept in mind that
the representation of a stylized fact can depend on the level of
regional aggregation. Moreover, by design it cannot be expected
that all projections match all stylized facts, since they all except
SSP2 assume signiﬁcant structural changes from past behavior.
The continued increase in the amount of capital per worker as
postulated by Kaldor fact SF2 can be seen in all scenarios and is
indicated by the higher growth rates of the capital compared to the
labor input as illustrated in Fig. 6. Kaldor fact SF4 is discussed in the
Supplementary Material S4. As part of the scenario design, we
made different assumptions on the dynamics of the capital output
elasticity. Although changes are slow, capital-output ratios change
over time. For the majority of regions and SSPs we can observe an
increasing level which is in agreementwith empirical observations
illustrated by Fig. S2 in the Supplementary Material S4.
A major point of interest is how the convergence pattern can be
evaluated against the stylized facts. In accordancewithNewKaldor
fact NSF3, the variation across regions in the growth rate of per
capita GDP (2015–2100) increases with the distance to the
technology frontier (see Fig. 7). This feature is more pronounced
in the scenarios that include low growth and divergence (SSP3 and
SSP4) than in the high growth and convergence scenarios (SSP1,
SSP5). Note that a ‘triangle’-shape is seen historically if data are
nationally disaggregated. Regional aggregation probably has an
averaging effect that blurs the appearance of a stronger spread in
growth rates especially for low income countries.
There is a good match of New Kaldor fact NSF4 and NSF5 across
all scenarios. According to the former, income and productivity
differences are large and the dominant factor of GDP growth is the
Solow residual, i.e. TFP. In addition to Fig. 6 which already
demonstrates the role of TFP in explaining GDP per capita growth,
Fig. S3 (in Supplementary Material S6) provides further evidence
by showing the correlation between GDP growth and TFP growth
across all regions in two time periods (2040 and 2070) for SSP2.
Regarding New Kaldor fact NSF5, the rising human capital per
worker is already obeyed due to scenario construction (see Section
3.4).
The hump-shaped growth pattern as stated by GSF4 can be
observed in most scenarios, but it is more pronounced in the
shorter time period. Fig. S4 (in Supplementary Material S6)
demonstrates this for the growth rates of the time period 2010–
2030 for scenario SSP2. Differences across all scenarios are small in
this short-term period.
Regional GDP growth rates and average investment shares are
positively correlated across all scenarios (Dosi stylized fact DSF10).
This result follows directly from the approach of scenario design
based on a Solow and Ramsey growthmodel. Actually, this stylized
fact can be used to justify the pursued approach (see Section 3.5).
Correspondence with stylized fact GSF2 is restricted by scenario
design which considers the convergence property as one of the
distinguishing features of the SSP scenarios. Hence, all scenarios
that assume convergence as part of their storyline do not match
this stylized fact (SSP1, SSP2 and SSP5). Fig. 5 indicates that in SSP3
and SSP4 per capita income does not always converges. However,
the twin-peaking of world income distribution disappears in bothscenarios in the coming decades and returns only very moderately
in SSP4. Fig. 8 shows the development of the Gini coefﬁcient in all
SSP scenarios. According to this, world income is most equally
distributed in SSP1, followed by SSP5 and SSP2. Due to growth
stagnation in SSP3, there is no further reduction of the income
disparity. In SSP4 the convergence of middle income countries ﬁrst
narrows the range of income distribution, but in the long-run the
income gap to the low-income group, which gains in population
share, widens again.
In summary, with the exception of GSF2, we ﬁnd a reasonable
match with the stylized facts reported in the literature. The match
with some of the stylized facts is better in the short term than in
the long term. This can be seen as a consequence of the principle
limitation (lack of time persistence) of socio-economic trends.
Convergence assumptions are quite strong for most of the
projections, but the span of average growth rates of per capita
income ﬁts well to the historical observation. A combination of
higher growth of the technological leader and lower convergence
rates would be an alternative for generating projections within a
comparable global range, but with an even larger spread in
regional per capita incomes. The adoption of more extreme
assumptions (e.g. negative growth rates) would either lead to
projections with implausible global long-term income levels or
would assume a highly arbitrary process of selecting countries and
regions to be subjected to extreme assumptions. In the end, the
[(Fig._8)TD$FIG]
Fig. 8. Inter-region Gini coefﬁcient.
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the variety of global future GDP butwill probably not represent the
diverse development the future will confront us with on the
regional or national level.
5. Summary and conclusions
This paper presents a set of GDP projections consistent with the
narratives of new shared socio-economic pathways (SSP). By using
an economic growth model for the scenario design, the spread
between the GDP projections is determined by ﬁve factors: labor
input, capital input, output elasticities, long-term growth of the
economy at the technology frontier, and convergence of total factor
productivity in economies below the technology frontier. GDP
projections are provided for 32 countries andworld regions.While
thus the projections bear less information than the country-based
projections provided by Cuaresma ( [12_TD$DIFF] 017) and Dellink et al. ( [12_TD$DIFF] 017),
data reduction by country aggregation facilitates consistency
checks, sensitivity analyses and interpretation of results. At the
global average, per capita GDP is projected to grow annually in a
range between 1.0% (SSP3) and 2.8% (SSP5) from 2010 to 2100. The
study demonstrates the robustness of the scenarios by successfully
testing the scenario results against stylized facts from empirical
economic literature and by demonstrating low sensitivity to the
choice of input parameters in terms of their ability to shift
pathways into other domains.
The underlying SSP narratives are translated into different
economic futures. The sustainableworld of SSP1 is accompanied by
amedium to high per capita income growth of 2.2% annually at the
global average over the whole century. Average growth is
particular high in today’s low income countries (4.1%). This
reﬂects rapid technological change in these countries facilitated by
international cooperation, technology diffusion and progress in
education. While the ‘‘Middle of the Road’’ projection SSP2
achieves at the global level similar absolute income levels like
SSP1, the per capita income is signiﬁcantly lower (growth rate
2.0%). This is mainly due to less international cooperation, slower
technological change and hence less convergence between the
advanced world regions and the developing world regions. Per
capita income growth in the low income group is 3.5% over the
century. Technical progress ceases in the fragmentedworld of SSP3.
Restrictions in international trade, technology and knowledge
transfers reduce the per capita income growth rates to the verylow end of historical growth rates (1.6% for low income countries
and 0.6% for high income countries). SSP4 is characterized as an
unequal world. This is reﬂected in the GDP scenario by the fact
that the low income regions, which in other scenarios show the
highest growth rates, substantially fall behind the middle income
group. Increasing inequality is also shown by an increasing Gini
coefﬁcient in the second half of the century. The increasing
population share of the low income regions lead to a global
average income growth rate of 1.7% which is lower than those of
the other medium growth scenarios SSP1 and SSP2. Finally, the
high growth projection in SSP5 is accompanied by global per
capita income growth of 2.8%. Most remarkably, this is the only
projection which for a particular income group shows higher
growth rates in the long run than in the short run. Due to the
strong growth orientation and continued fast technological
progress in the advanced world regions, the convergence process
of the developing world regions takes longer. Average per capita
income growth of 4.0% in the ﬁrst half of the century is followed by
4.5% in the second half for the low income countries.
The GDP projections developed here provide an essential input
for the integrated assessment of global environmental change, in
particular climate change. The different growth trajectories across
the SSPs will trigger assessment studies with different levels of
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change impacts. Different
mitigation and adaptation strategies have to be explored to deal
with resulting climate change. The strong linkage of the GDP
projection design to the SSP storylines allow for combining the
GDP assumptions with other assumptions (e.g. on energy demand
and land use) that follow these storylines andwhich are needed for
a comprehensive integrated assessment of climate change.
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Appendix B
Table A.1 Region [23_TD$DIFF]mapping.
SINGLE-COUNTRY REGIONS
Brazil (BRA); Canada (CAN); Indonesia (IDN); India (IND); Japan (JPN); Korea,
Rep. (KOR);Mexico (MEX), Russian Federation (RUS), South Africa (SAF); Turkey
(TUR); Taiwan (TWN)
AGGREGATED REGIONSRegion CountriesAUNZ Australia; New ZealandCAS Armenia; Azerbaijan; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyz Republic;
Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; UzbekistanCHN China; Hong Kong, SAR; Macao, SAREEU Albania; Bosnia andHerzegovina; Croatia;Macedonia FYR; Serbia;
MontenegroEEU-FSU Belarus; Moldova; UkraineEFTA Switzerland; Norway; IcelandEU12-H Cyprus; Czech Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Malta; Poland; Slovak
Republic; SloveniaEU12-M Bulgaria; Latvia; Lithuania; RomaniaEU15 Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece;
Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Portugal; Spain;
Sweden; United KingdomLAM-L Haiti; Belize; Guatemala; Honduras; Nicaragua
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SINGLE-COUNTRY REGIONS
Brazil (BRA); Canada (CAN); Indonesia (IDN); India (IND); Japan (JPN); Korea,
Rep. (KOR);Mexico (MEX), Russian Federation (RUS), South Africa (SAF); Turkey
(TUR); Taiwan (TWN)
AGGREGATED REGIONSLAM-M Argentina; Bolivia; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominican
Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Jamaica; Paraguay; Panama; Peru;
Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; Venezuela, RB; Antigua and
Barbuda; Bahamas, The; Barbados; Bermuda; Dominica; Grenada;
Guyana; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; St. Kitts and
Nevis; Suriname; Martinique; Guadeloupe; Netherlands Antilles;
French GuianaMEA-H Israel; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; United Arab Emirates; Saudi Arabia;
BahrainMEA-M Iraq; Jordan; Lebanon; Syrian Arab Republic; Yemen, Rep.; Iran,
Islamic Rep.; Occupied Palestinian TerritoryNAF Algeria; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Libya; Morocco; Tunisia; Western
SaharaOAS-CPA Cambodia; Vietnam; Lao PDR; MongoliaOAS-L Nepal; Bangladesh; Micronesia, Fed. Sts.; Papua New Guinea;
Philippines; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Timor-Leste; Tonga;
Vanuatu; Fiji; Korea, Dem. Rep.; MyanmarOAS-M Brunei Darussalam; French Polynesia; Singapore; Malaysia;
Maldives; Thailand; Bhutan; Sri Lanka; New Caledonia; GuamPAK Pakistan; AfghanistanSSA_L Benin; Cameroon; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Cote d’Ivoire; Congo, Rep.;
Eritrea; Ethiopia; Ghana; Kenya; Mozambique; Nigeria; Senegal;
Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Zambia; Zimbabwe; Burkina Faso;
Burundi; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros;
Djibouti; Gambia, The; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Lesotho; Liberia;
Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Rwanda; Sao Tome
and Principe; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Swaziland; Uganda;SSA-M Angola; Botswana; Gabon; Equatorial Guinea; Mauritius; NamibiaUSA United States; Puerto Rico; United States Virgin IslandsReferences
Abramovitz, M., 1956. Resource and output trends in the United States since 1870.
Am. Econ. Rev. 46, 5–23.
Acemoglu, D., Autor, D., 2011. Skills, tasks and technologies: implications for
employment and earnings. In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of
Labor Economics, Volume 4, Part B. Elsevier, pp. 1043–1171.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., 2005. Institutions as a fundamental cause
of long-run growth. In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S.N. (Eds.), Handbook of Economic
Growth. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 384–473.
Aghion, P., Howitt, P.W., 1998. Endogenous Growth Theory. The MIT Press.
Barro, R., Lee, J.-W., 2010. A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World,
1950–2010. NBER Working Paper No. 15902, Cambridge, MA. www.barrolee.
com.
Cuaresma, J.C., 2017. Income Projections for climate change research: a framework
based on human capital dynamics. Global Environ. Change 42, 226–236.
Dellink, R., Chateau, J., Lanzi, E., Magne´, B., 2017. Long-term economic growth
projections in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. Global Environ. Change 42,
200–214.
Dollar, D., 1992. Outward-oriented developing economies really do grow more
rapidly: evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976–1985. Econ. Dev. Cult. Change 40,
523–544.Dosi, G., 1995. Hierarchies, markets and power: some foundational issues on the
nature of contemporary economic organizations. Ind. Corp. Change 3, 1–45.
Durlauf, S.N., 1996. A theory of persistent income inequality. J. Econ. Growth 1,
75–93.
Easterly, W., 1994. Economic stagnation, ﬁxed factors, and policy thresholds.
J. Monet. Econ. 33, 525–557.
Easterly, W., 2006. Reliving the 1950s: the big push, poverty traps, and takeoffs in
economic development. J. Econ. Growth 11, 289–318.
Galor, O., 1996. Convergence? Inferences from theoretical models. Econ. J. 106,
1056–1069.
Hawksworth, J., 2006. The World in 2050 – How Big Will the Major Emerging
Market Economies Get and How Can the OECD Compete. PricewaterhouseCoo-
pers.
Heston, A., Summers, R., Aten, B., November 2012. Penn World Table Version 7.1.
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the
University of Pennsylvania.
IEA, 2009. World Energy Outlook 2009. International Energy Agency.
ILO, 2011. Key Indicators of the Labor Market (KILM), Seventh Edition, CD-ROM
Version.
Jones, C.I., Romer, P.M., 2010. The New Kaldor facts: ideas, institutions, population,
and human capital. Am. Econ. J.: Macroecon. 2 (1), 224–245.
Kaldor, N., 1961. Capital accumulation and economic growth. In: Lutz, F.A., Hague,
D.C. (Eds.), The Theory of Capital. St. Martins Press, pp. 177–222.
KC, S., Lutz, W., 2017. The human core of the shared socioeconomic pathways:
population scenarios by age, sex and level of education for all countries to 2100.
Global Environ. Change 42, 181–192.
Kemp-Benedict, E., 2012. Downscaling global income scenarios assuming institu-
tional convergence or divergence. Global Environ. Change 22, 877–883.
King, R.G., Levine, R., 1994. Capital fundamentalism, economic development, and
economic growth. Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Ser. Public Policy 40, 259–292,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(94)90011-6.
Lejour, A., Veenendaal, P., Verweij, G., Van Leeuwen, N., 2006. WorldScan: A Model
for International Economic Policy Analysis, CPB Document. Available at: http://
www.cpb.nl/sites/default/ﬁles/publicaties/download/worldscan-model-
international-economic-policy-analysis.pdf (accessed 30.05.13).
Lucas, R., 1988. On the mechanics of economic development. J. Monet. Econ. 22,
3–42.
Mankiw, N.G., Romer, D.,Weil, D.N., 1992. A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth. Q. J. Econ. 107 (2), 407–437, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118477.
McCombie, J.S.L., Thirlwall, A.P., 1995. Economic Growth and the Balance-of-Pay-
ments Constraint. Palgrave Macmillan.
McKibbin, W.J., Pearce, D., et al., 2009. Climate change scenarios and long term
projections. Clim. Change 97, 23–47.
Nakicenovic, N., Swart, R., 2000. Special Report on Emissions Scenarios. IPCC.
O’Neill, B.C., Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Ebi, K.L., Hallegatte, S., Carter, T.R., Mathur, R., van
Vuuren, D., 2014. A new scenario framework for climate change research: the
concept of shared socioeconomic pathways. Clim. Change 122, 387–400.
O’Neill, B.C., Kriegler, E., Ebi, K.L., Kemp-Benedict, E., Riahi, K., Rothman, D.S., van
Ruijven, B., van Vuuren, D.P., Birkmann, J., Kok, K., Levy, M., Solecki, W., 2015.
The roads ahead: narratives for shared socioeconomic pathways describing
world futures in the 21st century. Global Environ. Change (in press).
Pritchett, L., 1997. Divergence, big time. J. Econ. Perspect. 11, 3–17.
Psacharopoulos, G., 1994. Returns to investment in education: a global update.
World Dev. 22, 1325–1343.
Quah, D.T., 1996. Empirics for economic growth and convergence. Eur. Econ. Rev. 40,
1353–1375.
Rodrik, D., 2013. Unconditional convergence in manufacturing. Q. J. Econ. 128,
165–204.
Romer, P., 1990. Endogenous technological change. J. Polit. Econ. 98, S71–S102.
Solow, R.M., 1957. Technical change and the aggregate production function. Rev.
Econ. Stat. 39, 312–320.
UN, 2010. World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision (CD-ROM Edition).
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
van Vuuren, D., Kriegler, E., O’Neill, B.C., Ebi, K.L., Riahi, K., Carter, T.R., Edmonds, J.,
Hallegatte, S., Kram, T., Mathur, R.,Winkler, H., 2014. A new scenario framework
for climate change research: scenario matrix architecture. Clim. Change 122,
373–386.
